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ABSTRACT
HAILEY WALLEY: Two Arguments for Extending Legal Personhood to Nature
This thesis will articulate new sorts of arguments under a legal philosophy framework that I
believe can be used to protect the environment, but which also have a chance at convincing a
wide range of citizens and politicians. The conclusion for which I will argue is that the United
States should extend legal personhood to Nature. I will first provide detailed analyses of two
countries that have already extended rights to nature, Ecuador and Bolivia. I will then proceed to
compare the two cases and discuss what aspects of their models can and cannot be applied to the
United States, and why. I will then lay the groundwork for my first argument by reviewing how
legal personhood is currently treated in American law, and then demonstrate how the reasons
used to justify extending legal personhood to other non-traditional entities apply to Nature.
Finally, my second main argument is grounded on the premise that autonomy has great value:
we need to extend legal personhood to the environment to protect individual U.S. citizens. The
purpose of these arguments is to show how the environmentalist and libertarian parties can
form a coalition to protect Nature, albeit for different underlying reasons. By doing so, I believe
it will increase the chances for success in granting Nature rights and ensuring Her protection.
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Introduction
As is evidenced by climate change and its noticeable effects, the Earth is currently dying
at an unprecedented rate that humanity can no longer ignore. In the last decade, the world’s
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have increased by 23 parts per million, the average global
temperature has increased by 3.2 degrees Fahrenheit, and the sea levels have risen by 43
millimeters. These numbers do not mean anything out of context, though, so let us take this into
consideration: the highest recorded carbon dioxide levels on Earth prior to 1950 were never
above 300 parts per million, and we are now reaching 410 part per million this year; we have not
seen a decline in average global temperatures since 1910; and sea levels have risen by nearly
250 millimeters since 1870. This goes to show the dire situation humanity faces in light of our
unsustainable actions, and it calls for proactive measures to be taken to prevent further damage.
However, announcing that something needs to be done is different from convincing
citizens and politicians that action is necessary. Although there are numerous credible sources
that recommend action, climate change continues to be questioned and/or refuted as a way to
justify our capitalistic tendencies that often utilize unsustainable methods in the name of
efficiency. Moreover, even those who are sympathetic may see no clear way forward, and may
resign themselves to believing that there is no way to change the minds of doubters and skeptics.
My thesis will articulate new sorts of arguments under a legal philosophy framework that
I believe can be used to protect the environment, but that also have a chance at convincing a
wide range of citizens and politicians. The conclusion for which I will argue is that the United
States should extend legal personhood to Nature. If such personhood were extended, the
environment would be far better protected and healthy. The arguments for this conclusion,
however, will not be based on extremely controversial premises or ideas that will strike
Americans as strange. On the contrary, my arguments will be largely be based in concepts that
1

are already widely recognized and accepted in American law and tradition: namely, that the
disabled and corporations are treated as legal persons, and that individual autonomy has great
value. Someone who is not an environmentalist could accept the arguments I have developed in
my thesis. In fact, someone who is a proponent of libertarianism could accept my arguments.
I believe that by taking this legal approach the environmental movement can diversify its
platform in order to gain wider support which will encourage the implementation of
environmental protection statutes.
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Part I: Historical Examples of Extending Personhood to Nature
Some may think that we do not need to make new arguments to defend the idea that the
environment deserves the status of a legal person. After all, countries like Ecuador and Bolivia
have already given the environment this status, and we might assume that America can simply
follow their example. In this first part of my thesis, I’ll argue that such an approach won’t work.
Although we may wish to copy certain specific aspects of their approach, the model used in
Ecuador and Bolivia cannot be directly applied in the U.S. If the U.S. is to grant the
environment the status of a legal person, a different approach will be needed than the one
pursued by these countries.
In this section, I will first provide detailed analyses of two countries that have already
extended rights to nature, Ecuador and Bolivia. I will then proceed to compare the two cases and
discuss what aspects of their models can and cannot be applied to the United States, and why.
This, then, will set up my argument in the following sections as to how I believe America will
need to approach extending rights to Nature in order for it to be successful.
I.1 Case Studies: Ecuador and Bolivia
Two Latin American countries have already instated such rights to nature, namely
Ecuador and Bolivia. In these countries, the Rights of Nature function as both a religious
principle of inclusion and as a weapon against the State. Both elements were covered under the
rubric of overall political reform - ‘ethnodevelopment.
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I.1.a Case Study: Ecuador
Ecuador has a presidential republic with a representative democracy, and is considered a
plurinational polity; seven percent of its population is of indigenous heritage and another seventy
percent is of mixed indigenous and European heritage, known as Mestizos.1
In 2008, Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, proposed a redrafting of the Ecuadorian
constitution to grant rights to Pachamama. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of
Ecuador (CONAIE) was largely responsible for Correa’s election and the establishment of the
new law and constitution. The redrafted Constitution made these provisions in Chapter 7, now
known as the Rights of Nature:
Article 71: Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist,
persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution.
Every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of rights
for nature before the public. The application and interpretation of these rights will follow the
related principles established in the Constitution.
The State will motivate natural and juridical persons as well as collectives to protect nature; it will
promote respect towards all the elements that form an ecosystem.
Article 72: Nature has the right to restoration. This integral restoration is independent of the
obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the people and the collectives
that depend on the natural systems.
In the case of severe or permanent environmental impact, including the ones caused by the
exploitation of non renewable natural resources, the State will establish the most efficient
mechanisms for the restoration, and will adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate the
harmful environmental consequences.
Article 73: The State will apply precaution and restriction measures in all the activities that can
lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration of
the natural cycles.
1

"Ecuador Population 2019." Ecuador Population 2019 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs). Accessed March 18, 2019.
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ecuador-population/.
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The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that can alter in a definitive way
the national genetic patrimony is prohibited.
Article 74: The persons, people, communities and nationalities will have the right to benefit from
the environment and form natural wealth that will allow wellbeing.
If the environmental services cannot be appropriated, its production, provision, use, and
exploitation will be regulated by the State.2

The people of Ecuador voted on this, and nearly two-thirds of the populace voted in the
affirmative, therein resulting in its establishment. In this document, we can see legal rights being
explicitly extended to Mother Nature. For example, Article 71 states Her right to exist and
flourish, and it provides her legal representation by the populace to enforce this right.
However, though the law may have its intellectual origin in ideas promoted by CONAIE,
there were other important political influences at play. In fact, in some ways it seems that the
indigenous ideology espoused by CONAIE was deployed more as as a lobbying effort than
serving as the actual cause of its establishment. I believe there were at least three other groups
that helped cause the establishment of this new law.
First, the primary political force at work was the 2006 Alianza Pais government plan
termed “revolucion ciudana” - citizen revolution - that was based on the Quechwa (indigenous
group) principles of “sumak kawsay,” or “living well.” These principles refer to “a development
regime based on well-being as opposed to neoliberal economic growth.”3 When a group of
unsolicited citizens proposed the incorporation of rights for animals and nature to the
Constitutional Assembly, the Pais government took hold of this idea as a pretext for the radical
transformation of the new government. Alberto Acosta, an economist, academic, politician, and
environmental activist who served as the Energy Minister and president of the Constitutional
Assembly during its redrafting, argued for the establishment of nature’s rights from the
2

"Rights of Nature Articles in Ecuador’s Constitution." The Rights of Nature. https://therightsofnature.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/Rights-for-Nature-Articles-in-Ecuadors-Constitution.pdf.
3
Akchurin, Maria. "Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and Environmental
Protection in Ecuador." Journal of the American Bar Foundation: Law and Social Inquiry 40, no. 4 (2015): 954.
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perspective of environmental justice by pointing out that the expansion of rights has always been
thought of as unthinkable until it is done - e.g. women’s rights. He argued that it was time to
recognize that the environment “has values that are inherent and independent of human use,” and
that “Guaranteeing a healthy and ecologically balanced environment goes hand in hand with
cultural strengthening, and that is a genuine human right that is weaved together with the right to
life, health, work, dignity, and identity.”4 Acosta, then, like other members of the Pais
government, approached this from the perspective that while the environment is an independent
entity deserving of rights, it also serves as vehicle for expanding humans rights and protections.
Also greatly responsible for this law’s establishment were the environmental social
movements that did much of the “groundwork for elevating the environmental agenda at the
national level during the prior decades.”5 These environmental movements were spurred after
the rediscovery of oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon basin in 1967, where a refinery was established
and the Trans-Ecuador oil pipeline system was created.6 This pipeline system created conflict
between the State and the people who ascribed to indigenous ideology. Those in the
environmental social movement were worried that, in this conflict, land and resources were
being viewed as commodities to be exploited rather than as making up an interconnected force
that binds all of reality. There were also other environmental lawyers, along with activists and
governmental officials, who had previously been looking into this concept in response to the
continued patterns of environmental degradation in the country.
The third major group that pushed for the change in law was not, in fact, too concerned
with the Rights of Nature as such. Rather, this group was motivated by the idea that Rights of
Nature could function as a weapon against the State - the State that was exercising unfair power

4

Tanasescu, Mihnea. "The Rights of Nature in Ecuador: The Making of an Idea." International Journal of
Environmental Studies 70, no. 6 (2013): 849.
5
Akchurin, 939.
6
Ibid, 945.
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over its people. For example, this group was very troubled by Article 408 that clearly states that
“all natural resources are the property of the state.”7 Such an article claims that the state has the
power to exploit the region’s natural resources without any approval or say of the people. The
indigenous peoples, in particular, were hurt by this due to the clear difference in moral principles
between them as naturalists and the State. The State was only focused on profit and
industrialization, which is one of the reasons this issue came to be addressed during the
constitutional redraft. So, this fight was not only about the environment. This group was also
fighting for overall political reform that would “prioritize food sovereignty over exports, the use
of traditional agricultural practices as opposed to methods relying on heavy use of monocultures
and pesticides, and valuing biodiversity.”8 In other words, many of the indigenous proponents
were fighting not only for Pachamama, but also for themselves as marginalized peoples.
In conclusion, then, the extension of legal rights to the environment in Ecuador is not a
simple story of promoting environmentalism. Many groups had many different motivations for
this action. Moreover, it must be said that since the law was passed, there have been continuing
challenges in Ecuador: the government still favors export industries that bring in revenue, and it
never did suspend oil drilling in the Yasuni National Park. Nevertheless, the people of Ecuador
continue to use the power this law did grant to them. They have filed suit in Her name, such as
the cases involving “the Nilcambamba River in Loja province, another involving the Blanco
River in Pichincha province, environmental damage connected to a mining concession in
Mirador in El Pangui, Zamora, and another connected to road infrastructure expansion in Santa
Cruz in the Galapagos.”9
I.1.b Case Study: Bolivia

7
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8

7

Another country to have granted rights to Pachamama, or Mother Nature, is a
neighboring Andean nation, Bolivia. In 1952, the lowland indigenous peoples were excluded
from the agrarian reform, which classified them as ‘savages.’ In response, a global indigenous
rights movement slowly emerged in Bolivia, and in the 1970s it sought “to challenge the until
then dominant ‘assimilationist’ approach to indigenous development” in order to preserve
fragile or valuable environments from destruction.10 The indigenous rights advocates were
lobbying for alternative models of development that would allow indigenous peoples to
develop in a way that was appropriate for their culture. This lobbying effort brought about a
paradigmatic shift in Bolivia towards ‘ethnodevelopment,’ or ‘development with identity.”11 In
fact, in the 1980s and 1990s, when the World Bank began promoting and financing the
collective titling of indigenous territories in numerous countries in order to protect the rights of
‘tribal-people’ from being harmed by developmental projects, this World Bank effort was able
to build upon the new ‘ethnodevelopment’ plan introduced in the previous decade.
In Bolivia, we thus see that the shift towards ethnodevelopment was largely based on
the idea that indigenous people have a role in biodiversity conservation once they are provided
with secure land rights. The idea that cultural diversity and biodiversity are closely linked is
what spurred this shift; “our knowledge of biodiversity rests in cultural diversity, and
conserving biodiversity helps strengthen cultural integrity and values,” and the indigenous
peoples were the ones with the greatest knowledge regarding biodiversity in their region,
which made them vital to its protection.12 This is how indigenous people came to be known as
‘guardians of nature.’

10

Anthias, Penelope, and Sarah A. Radcliffe. "The Ethno-environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling
and the Production of Not-quite-neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." Geoforum 64 (2015): 259.
11
Ibid, 259.
12
Ibid, 260.
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This shift in perception regarding the indigenous was very different from the past. They
had previously been classified as ‘savages’ in Bolivia’s 1952 Agrarian Reform Law, which
excluded them and led to exploitative labor practices in their territories. In response to the
world-wide attention on the nation and its indigenous community that resulted from the World
Bank titling initiatives, Bolivia flipped its stance by recognizing indigenous territorial claims in its
1996 Agrarian Reform Law under a new legal category of Original Communal Lands (Tierras
Communitarias de Origen). This reform enabled indigenous groups to “formalize their land
rights and thus to be able to exclude land colonization and resource extraction from their
territory;” however, subsoil resources were not included and the lands titled to them were
often the least productive.13 This acts as an example of how these laws are meant to function in
liberal law: Bolivia’s government only changed its stance once the world took interest in their
indigenous peoples’ rights, and even then, the changes they made were undermined by
exploitative clauses that bolstered federal power.
As was the case in Ecuador, it is clear that the basis of this movement wasn’t simply to
protect biodiversity and the environment. Rather, one of the main motivations was to protect
the people affected by her destruction, especially the indigenous who have dual interests in the
form of religious protection and economic security. In other words, these laws, when upheld,
are valuable only inasmuch as they serve as an instrument for self-preservation.
I.1.c Comparing the Cases of Ecuador and Bolivia
Before asking whether the United States could follow the model of Ecuador or Bolivia in
extending legal rights to the environment, we should pause and articulate the major components
of their approach. I believe there are two main elements in both case studies. First, both of these

13

Ibid, 262.
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nations have predominant indigenous populations that continue to adhere to their indigenous
religious beliefs, which revolve around the Andean goddess Pachamama who parallels our
conception of Mother Earth. Latin America was converted to Christianity, specifically
Catholicism, during the Spanish Conquest, but the indigenous peoples found a way to retain
their religious ideology by melding the two religions into one, which is still how it functions
today. Mother Mary, for instance, became the new representation of Pachamama, as
demonstrated in the Andean Renaissance paintings of her depicted as a mountain.
When the Rights of Nature were included in the Bolivian Constitution in 2008, the
Bolivian government still formally aligned itself with the Catholic Church; a year later they
became a secular state as a way to promote religious freedom and inclusion, yet they retained
the recognition of Pachamama within the Rights of Nature. Ecuador, too, is a secular state, yet
it also utilized indigenous religious language by referencing Pachamama within its Rights of
Nature clause. In both cases, then, we see that the establishment of legal personhood in these
countries was highly influenced by this religious orientation toward nature that persists within
this region.
The other main common element in both of these case studies is that the motivation for
extending rights to the environment wasn’t simply for the sake of environmental protection,
but rather to protect the people affected by Her destruction. We have found that this is
especially true for the indigenous peoples who have dual interests in the form of religious
protection and economic security. In both Bolivia and Ecuador, the indigenous peoples were
hurt by the exploitation of natural resources by the government. In both cases, the State was
focused on profit and industrialization at the expense of the indigenous people, and in both
cases these people were looking for a way to exercise their power as citizens. In fact, that is
why this issue came to be addressed during the constitutional redrafts. Moreover, the
10

indigenous groups who were most commonly affected were the agricultural workers, and thus
the exploitation of the environment by the government and large corporations threatened
their economic livelihood.
In these ways, many of the indigenous proponents were fighting not only for
Pachamama, but also for themselves as marginalized peoples. These laws were not attempts to
prioritize nature over people, but rather legal tactics to protect the humans who were also part
of nature.
I.2 Application of the Ecuadorian and Bolivian Cases to the United States
We have found that the model used in Bolivia and Ecuador to extend legal rights to
Mother Nature had two parts: first, building on indigenous religious beliefs; second, using
environmental rights to protect vulnerable citizens. Could this same two-part model be used in
the United States? I doubt that it could be used effectively for two reasons.
First, it is difficult to see how indigenous religious beliefs could find traction in a secular
nation like America. The U.S. would not be able to approach such a shift towards eutierrianism,
or becoming one with nature, in the same fashion. The U.S. is an inherently secular nation; the
First Amendment of its Constitution delineates a separation of church and state and makes it
illegal to impede on the religious rights of its citizens.
In fact, it is quite telling that studies documenting environmental activism in the United
States have shown that they tend to steer away from any religious grounding. Take, for example,
Kauffman and Martin’s study of environmental cases from the United States, New Zealand, and
Ecuador.14 Their study was extremely thorough and they documented many different aspects of
14

Kauffman, Craig, Pamela Martin. “ Comparing Rights of Nature Laws in the U.S., Ecuador, and New Zealand:
Evolving Strategies in the Battle Between Environmental Protection and “Development.” Paper presented at the
International Studies Association Annual Conference, Baltimore, MD, February 2017, 1-45.
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the environmental movement in these different countries. They examine how people in all three
countries define nature, who speaks for nature, the rights granted to nature, the hierarchy of the
rights in regard to the legal system overall, its inclusion of precautionary principles, its
supportive secondary laws, its legal standing, and its recognition by the courts. Kauffman and
Martin found that the laws of both New Zealand and Ecuador were highly influenced by
indigenous beliefs that consider even non-living aspects of nature as possessing metaphysical
characteristics that make them deserving of moral consideration. However, even though their
account was extremely detailed and exhaustive, they uncovered no evidence that ecosystems in
United States ordinances are framed as living, spiritual beings. On the contrary, they are
conceptualized as “natural communities” whose welfare is necessary for the well-being of
human communities.
It is also important to mention that America is much more diverse and pluralistic than
these Latin American nations. This is evidenced by the partitioning of its land into fifty states,
many of which are comparable in size to all of Ecuador and/or Bolivia. Also there is the fact that
America is composed of immigrants from all reaches of life. For this reason, America does not
hold as singular an identity as these Latin American countries; it incorporates foreign customs
in varying degrees according to each individual. Thus, the land size and demographics of
America differ greatly from those of both Ecuador and Bolivia, and this is one reason why their
models cannot be directly applied to the United States.
Second, I believe that there are good reasons to think that the model used by Ecuador and
Bolivia has not been entirely successful. Studies have found that these laws’ basis in religious
ideology actually weakens their authority because they primarily function in liberal law as a way
to project an idealistic image to the rest of the world rather than being taken seriously by the
respective governments. In proving this claim there is the example of Ecuador not having
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suspended the drilling of oil in the Yasuni National Park, even though this contradicts their
Rights of Nature laws.
I believe it is clear, then, that the first component of the Bolivia/Ecuador model should
not be used in the United States. But what about the second component – the notion that
extending rights to the Environment could be used as a tactic for protecting citizens? Though
Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s Rights of Nature are both grounded in indigenous religious beliefs with
the intent of protecting Pachamama, the basis of these movements was also meant to protect the
people affected by Her destruction. In both countries, indigenous people used the Rights of
Nature as a weapon against the State that was exploiting their natural resources, treating them as
inferior, and causing economic insecurity.
Interestingly, Kauffman and Martin found that a similar approach was taken in the U.S.
communities that he analyzed. They found that nature’s rights were often linked to the concept
of community rights as a tool for protecting themselves against the vagaries of corporate
property rights. While it was never clear how seriously environmental advocates took the idea
that Nature itself was supposed to be protected as a legal person, they repeatedly extended
Mother Nature legal personhood as a mechanism for protecting the people. This is a common
theme that seems to have mobilized this movement.
I.3 Conclusion
Based on the historical examples of Bolivia and Ecuador, what sort of approach should
environmentalists use to extend legal personhood to the environment in the United States?
First, it is interesting that the environmental changes in both of these countries built
upon preexisting beliefs. As we’ve seen, in Bolivia and Ecuador, these preexisting beliefs
were religious in nature, and I’ve argued that we cannot hope to find such religious beliefs in
the United States. That said, I do believe that environmentalists can successfully find different
kinds of pre-existing beliefs which they could build upon to extend personhood to Nature. As I
13

will argue in Parts II and III of my thesis, environmentalists in the United States should turn to
widely-held beliefs in the legal world about corporate personhood. I’ll argue that arguments
for extending legal personhood to corporations can be copied and built upon to extend legal
personhood to Mother Nature.
Second, I think the model of Bolivia and Ecuador is helpful in showing that people will
readily accept extending rights to Nature if it can be shown that such rights can be used as a
tactic of self-protection. In part IV of my thesis, I’ll argue for a version of this sort of
argument that I believe would work well in the United States. I will argue that legal
personhood could be extended to Mother Nature as a tactic for protecting the deeplyentrenched value of personal autonomy.
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Part II: The Current Status of U.S. Legal Personhood
To find a more successful approach for extending personhood to nature, I think we
should turn to current American law and core philosophical principles. An argument that
incorporates current American norms and legal precedents has a better chance of being
persuasive than one incorporating the norms and precedents of South America. In this part of my
thesis, I lay the groundwork for that argument by reviewing how legal personhood is currently
treated in American law. In the next section, I will show how this American notion of legal
personhood can be extended to nature.
II.1 Description of Metaphysical Personhood vs. Legal Personhood
We should begin by clarifying what is meant by ‘legal personhood’; it should not be
confused with ‘metaphysical personhood’. Metaphysical personhood refers to “a basic category
of reality encompassing beings of a certain type: rational, moral agents, language using, etc.”15
Legal personhood, by contrast, “is any human or non-human entity that is recognized as having
privileges and obligations, such as having the ability to enter into contracts, to sue, and to be
sued;” it “often recognizes that certain groups of individuals can be considered as a unit, an
actor, a legal person.”16,17 Because these are very different, legal person status can be extended

15

"Concept of Personhood." University of Missouri School of Medicine. Accessed February 14, 2019.
https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/personhood.
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Kornhauser, Lewis, and W. Bentley Macleod. "Contracts between Legal Persons." National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2010, 1.
17
“Concept of Personhood.”
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to artificial persons, such as corporations, unlike with the metaphysical denotation that is
grounded in “objective” aspects of reality.18
Almost all U.S. citizens fall under both categories of personhood, but there are instances
where this is not necessarily the case. For example, consider cognitively disabled persons.
While these citizens sometimes do not possess the necessary attributes to be considered
metaphysical persons, the law bolsters their rights as legal persons in order to protect their
rights as citizens and humans to the greatest extent possible. This solidifies their presence as
moral agents within society. Then there are those instances where non-human entities, like
corporations, which are not metaphysical persons in any sense, are granted legal personhood
under American law.
In both of these cases, American law has extended legal personhood to entities that do
not fulfill the metaphysical requirements for personhood. It is important for my argument that
we catalog the arguments used in American law that justify this extension. I will first discuss
disabled persons in regard to their capacity, or lack thereof, to be defined as metaphysical
persons; and then consider how these persons have been granted legal personhood by way of
a guardian relationship. Then, I will move to discussing the United States’ granting of legal
personhood to corporations, and the ways in which corporations are conceived by the law in
order for them to be deserving of such status.
II.2 Legal Personhood as Extended to the Cognitively Disabled

18

There is another distinction of personhood in regards to morality: “a moral person is an agent who is accountable;
who has both rights and responsibilities” (Dennett 1981: 176). This distinction, however, can arguably be
contained within both “metaphysical” and “legal” personhood considering that to have privileges and obligations
is synonymous with having rights and responsibilities, and to be a moral agent is a prerequisite for being a
metaphysical person.
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Disabled persons, and more specifically those that are mentally disabled, are often unable
to act as rational or moral agents, and are thus metaphysically different from other persons.
That being said, the U.S. government recognizes the inherent human nature of a disabled
person in the same way a human fetus, at 24 weeks old, is considered human even though it
lacks rationality or moral agency.
The 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
provides a particularly helpful way of understanding the reasons the disabled need the special
protection of legal personhood. There was “an emerging consensus in international human rights
discourse on the notion that all human persons, regardless of their decision-making capabilities,
should enjoy ‘legal capacity’ on an equal basis” to those who do have the ability to voice and
exercise their rights.19 As advanced by Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, there are currently three
ways legal systems inhibit the inclusion and representation of disabled persons: status, outcome,
and function. The status approach entails an individual being denied legal capacity based on
their medical/legal status as disabled. Under the outcome approach, the individual’s legal
capacity is denied or restricted based on “the perception that the individual has made a poor
decision,” such as having checked themselves out of a psychiatric treatment center that results in
legal restrictions to prevent them from leaving.20 Lastly, on the functional approach the
individual is determined by medical authorities to be unable to “use, weigh, and retain
information in order to make a decision, understand the consequences of the decision, and
communicate the decision to others.”21
It was because the disabled were not able able to participate in the political sphere in
these three ways that governments initially provided paternalistic protection by the law. This
19

Flynn, Eilionoir, and Anna Arstein-Kerslake. "Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right to Support in Exercising
Legal Capacity." International Journal of Law in Context 10, no. 01 (2014): 82.
20
Ibid, 86.
21
Ibid, 86.
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paternalistic approach to representing disabled persons relies on ‘substituted judgement’ in
which, in the wake of being classified disabled, their legal capacity is stripped from them and a
third-party is assigned to make decisions for them based on the objective or perceived ‘best
interest’ of the disabled person.
At the 2006 United Nations meeting, however, it was agreed that there was a fairer
approach than the paternalistic one. It was decided that disabled persons are better protected by
way of guardianship rather than strict paternalism. Along these lines, there is a call in moral
philosophy discourse for a holistic and inclusive notion of personhood that it is premised on the
“communicative and semantic aspects of human capabilities” rather than on cognition or
rationality.22 In implementing this holistic concept, a newly proposed approach, the support
model, entails an impartial guardian providing the necessary support to enable the individual to
exercise their legal capacity based on their existing strengths rather than focusing on the deficits
of the individual.
The CRPD promoted the extension of legal personhood to the disabled by way of
guardianship in Provisions 3 through 5 of Article 12 of the Convention:
3. States’ parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.
4. States’ parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide
for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human
rights law…such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity
respect the rights, will, and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time
possible, and are subject to regular review by a competent independent and impartial authority or
judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the
person’s rights and interests.
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5. Subject to the provision of this article, States’ parties shall take all appropriate and effective
measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control
their own financial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily
deprived of their property.23

As a member of the United Nations, the United States signed this Convention on July 30th of
2009 without any ratifications or optional protocol action.
This support model, then, is a guardianship approach where the disabled are allocated a
guardian who aids in representing them in legal matters according to their own wishes rather
than being subjected to paternalistic oversight. This move towards guardianship proves to be
revolutionary in its recognition of disabled persons as capable of acting as legal and moral
agents via representation. Though the line between guardianship and paternalism may prove to
be vague in certain instances when the disabled person in question has very limited capabilities
of expression or communication, the move towards recognizing their personhood and the actions
taken to protect this status is nonetheless a significant step toward providing them equal
opportunities.
II.3 Legal Personhood as Extended to Corporations
An even more dramatic example of non-traditional entities being considered legal
persons in the United States is the extension of legal person status to artificial beings like
corporations. Corporations were granted legal person status and rights in 1886 by the United
States Supreme Court under the argument that corporations had been “delegated responsibility
for ensuring society’s economic welfare.”24 But as time has gone on, there have been many
proposed arguments as to why legal personhood should be extended to corporations. Indeed, in
current American law, there are at least five different ways corporations are conceptualized that
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then justify the extension of legal personhood status to them: the concession theory, the
aggregate theory, the real entity theory, the nexus of contracts theory, and the intelligent
machine metaphor.25,26
The concession theory deems a corporation to be an ‘artificial person’ that depends on the
law to give it legal personality. Along similar lines, the nexus of contracts theory is an economic
approach that perceives corporations as entities that gain rights based on contracts drafted by
individuals that delineate such rights and boundaries. Under these theories, the corporation is
perceived to be a ‘person’ merely in legal terms as a way to address what rights and
responsibilities it holds, but it is not in any way believed to resemble or act as a real person.
These two theories differ primarily in that the concession theory calls for the federal and state
governments to decide the extent of a corporation’s rights and responsibilities while the nexus of
contracts approach places this authority in the hands of the shareholders. That is why the nexus
of contracts theory is an economic approach: it provides protection and power to the owners of
the company who will utilize such authority to their monetary advantage.
The aggregate theory assumes a corporation to be a collection of individuals that yields
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it. This theory is the first step towards
attributing human qualities to a corporation in that it recognizes the corporation as an
overarching representation of those within it. The corporation is viewed as an extension of the
peoples who compose it, which therein justifies its protection under the law as a legal person.
The intelligent machine metaphor theory views corporations as intelligent machines that
act independently of human action, and exist prior to and after individual members. This can be
perceived as either the ultimate representation of a corporation acting as a human, or as the least
anthropomorphic representation of a corporation. On the one hand, it is saying that a corporation
25
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is comparable to an artificial intelligence robot that is not human but is nonetheless treated as
one for the sake of legal means; this is similar to how the concession and nexus of contracts
theories perceive corporations. However, intelligence is often used as the primary standard for
distinguishing humans from other living creatures. Thus, it can be argued that the independent
nature of a corporation’s intelligence, as well as the breadth of the intelligence, would be
sufficient to consider it a pseudo-super-human.
The most widely endorsed approach in American law is the real entity theory, wherein
the corporation acts as a collective consciousness that results from the discussion and
compromise among the individual members that compose it, and that exists prior to and separate
from the State. On this theory, the corporation is perceived to be a ‘real’ person in terms of its
capacity to act as a moral agent and utilize rational thinking via the collective intent and action
of its constituents; and since the corporation is functioning as a real individual, it must be held
responsible as a legal person.
It is important to note that the word ‘real’ in this context is not synonymous to ‘natural.’
It is not that the corporation is believed to be a natural human being, but rather, the theory
recognizes that a corporation is actually existing, which is made possible by the collective
consciousness that constitutes its being. In this sense, like the concession and nexus of contracts
theories, the real entity theory also views the corporation as an artificial person, with the added
explicit recognition that it is also real. It also differs from those two theories in that while it may
recognize the synthetic nature of this real entity, it does not differentiate the corporation from
humans based on such; it grants corporations rights that are not necessarily guaranteed by the
contracts that spur their creation. In this regard, the real entity theory believes the differentiation
between natural and artificial persons to be irrelevant because both are granted inherent and
inviolable rights that are protected under the Constitution.
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Though the real entity theory has since prevailed in how the U.S. legal system perceives
corporations as persons, it should be noted that even the real entity theory is incomplete in
that “it fails to illuminate why the entity should receive constitutional protection as a person
and what the scope of that protection should be.”27 For instance, corporate entities do not
receive all the constitutional powers accorded to natural persons; they lack the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, they cannot vote or become citizens, and,
under corporate statutes, they cannot serve as directors of corporations, unlike individuals.28
Also, as artificial persons, corporations can have restrictions and sanctions that would never be
imposed on humans but are done so in these corporate instances because they enhance the
constitutional rights of humans.29 For instance, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was enacted
in order to restrict corporations from forming monopolies because this may lead to the
encroachment on a citizen’s right to liberty in that it could force consumer decisions by
eliminating all competition.
Thus, even under this prevailing real-entity theory, the conception of corporations as
legal persons is vastly different from how we perceive traditional humans as legal persons.
Though we may consider them artificial persons for the sake of legal terminology, the
application of legal person status to these non-traditional entities grants them specific rights and
restrictions that are unique to them in comparison to those granted to U.S. citizens. We may
arguably assert, then, that rather than fully extending legal person status to include corporations,
we have actually created a sub-category of legal personhood that contains corporations in the
same way that disabled persons have been granted a distinctive form of legal person status.
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With a clear conception of legal personhood, and with an overview of how this has been
applied in the U.S. to things that are different from typical metaphysical persons, I can begin
my argument for extending legal personhood to nature.
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Part III: Extending Personhood to Nature: The Argument by Analogy
My first argument is an extended argument by analogy: legal personhood is currently
extended to corporations and the disabled; Nature resembles the disabled and corporations in
relevant ways; thus, legal personhood should be extended to Nature. In comparing the disabled
to the environment, I will address the similarities in their incapacities, and then I will discuss
how the guardianship approach can be applied to the environment. The approach I will take in
comparing the environment to corporations will entail a demonstration of how the theories used
to justify the extension of legal personhood to corporations can similarly be applied to the
environment.
III.1 The Disabled as Legal Persons —> The Environment as a Legal Person
As discussed in section two, cognitively disabled persons are granted a special form of
legal personhood status in the United States in order to protect their rights as human beings. To
be specific, the CRPD concluded that disabled individuals should be judged by their strengths
rather than their weaknesses, and that they are to be provided legal guardians that are meant to
represent the individuals and their desires to the greatest extent without enacting paternalistic
oversight.
The cognitively disabled, as persons who are unable to express clearly their thoughts and
desires, closely resemble the environment that is exploited due to its inability to communicate in
the same way humans do. Thus, if we are willing to grant guardianship and representation to a
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group of people who technically lack the agency to be considered a metaphysical person, then
Mother Nature, too, has a basis for being granted similar representation and guardianship.
After all, the underlying similarity between the disabled and the environment is not only
that they cannot use language to express their desires, but the fact that they are both living.
While there are many things that cannot use language, such as shoes or a lamp, what makes it
significant in the case of the environment is that it is composed of entities that are organic, living
beings without the full capacity to express themselves as fully functional humans can. On the
basis of these similarities, we should grant Nature, as the single entity encompassing these living
beings, guardianship as a way to acknowledge Her living status and offer Her the opportunity to
express and protect Herself in the same way we provide such protection to the disabled who also
lack this capacity.
There are different ways of extending legal personhood to the disabled and the
environment. In both of these instances it is important to differentiate between guardianship and
paternalism. Paternalism is when a person of authority restricts another’s rights for their
supposed best interest. Guardianship, on the other hand, considers the wishes of the individual in
question when making legal decisions for them. This creates a mutual bond between the two
rather than an authoritarian complex that places the incapacitated at a disadvantage. In
addressing this concern, I propose that a way to ensure fair guardianship of Mother Nature
would be for environmental scientists to represent her in legal matters rather than politicians
who have conflicting interests in economic matters. Just as the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities concluded that assigning just any third-party individual
was not sufficient for providing the disabled person fair representation, Mother Nature also
would need representation by persons who are adequately versed in her processes and needs so
as to ensure she is being provided unbiased aid. Though this is not a fail-safe method,
considering that even the scientist could be easily persuaded or bribed to make certain decisions,
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I do feel that the scientist is still more qualified and protected from these vices than politicians
who are more distanced from the agent in consideration.
The question then becomes: how and to what do we grant such guardianship in the case
of the environment - each animal, every plant, or ecosystems as a single unit? I propose that
guardianship should be extended to ecosystems as a whole rather than to specific species or
entities. This belief is grounded in the fact that though the pollution of only one water source or
the death of one species of fish may be the topic of debate within some legal case, the
destruction of any one thing in nature will almost always cause detrimental effects on the rest of
the ecosystem due to the interrelated nature of reality. For instance, the pollution of a river could
poison and kill a particular species of fish - a species that is the primary food source for some
species of bird that will now also die due to the lack of available sustenance, and then the foxes
that depend on those birds for sustenance will lose their food source, as well - and this cycle will
continue to extend throughout the entire food chain until it has affected each and every tier in
some way. That being said, the ideal guardian, then, would be one who focuses their studies on
and has direct experience with the particular ecosystem in question. This is because a specialized
expert will have a better understanding of the historical and current conditions of the specific
ecosystem, as well as what would be in its best interest for maintaining an equilibrium for
sustaining life.
III.2 The Corporation as a Legal Person —> The Environment as a Legal Person
As we saw in the last part of my thesis, there are many different arguments people have
proposed to justify extending legal personhood to corporations. I believe that when we compare
the status of corporations (as commonly theorized) to the environment, we find a number of
similarities. While it is true that some theories of corporations are more helpful than others, all
the theories expose avenues by which legal personhood could be extended to Nature for reasons
similar to those used to extend them to corporations.
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III.2.a The Concession and Nexus of Contracts Theories
First, recall the concession and nexus of contract theories that extend personhood to
corporations in order to legally enforce their regulation and restriction by adjudging them
‘artificial persons.’ When considering the environment in the context of the concession and
nexus of contracts theories that support corporations being granted legal personhood, we might
argue that there is nothing less artificial about thinking of the environment as an artificial being
or as a site of contracts than is the case for corporations. As discussed in the previous section,
the environment is arguably more closely related to metaphysical persons than most things,
considering its living, organic nature; so, in some ways, it is more feasible to consider the
environment an artificial person than even a corporation. Thus, the environment, too, could be
granted legal person status, as an artificial person that is dependent on laws to give it legal
personality. Nevertheless, considering that the vague nature of this standard thereby permits
almost anything to be granted such status on this basis, I consider this to be one of the less
convincing ways to argue that legal personhood extends to Nature.
III.2.b The Aggregate Theory
Next, I turn to the aggregate theory. It justifies the granting of legal personhood to
corporations by extending the rights of the individuals within it to the corporation itself, thereby
viewing the corporation as an extension of the individual. Thus, if the basis of the legal
personhood of corporations lies in the fact that a corporation is a collection of individuals that
may yield the collection rights and duties based on those of its constituents, then we can argue
that the environment only further exemplifies this definition, considering that all of humanity,
life, and even non-living things compose it. The environment is the broadest extension of the
individual. In fact, I think it is useful to think of the environment along the model of an
umbrella: a collection of humans compose a corporation, a collection of humans and
corporations make up a government, and all humans, plus living and non-living things such as
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the corporations and governments, constitute the environment. At each stage, we use the
aggregate theory to grant rights to these larger entities as a way to support the rights of the
individuals within them; we could extend such status to the environment in the same aggregating
way we do to the corporations and governments within it.
The predominant issue with trying to extend such rights to the environment is that it only
explicitly supports the rights of humans within the environment as holders of rights themselves,
whereas the animals and other living entities that do not inherently hold rights are not assumed
to also receive such protection. Though the environment as a whole would necessarily be
granted legal personhood, the aggregate theory may only provide protection to humans as those
who are extending their rights to the environment. The other creatures of nature are left exposed
still, which contradicts the purpose of the argument. Thus, the weakness of the aggregate theory
is that some entity only gains rights by extending the rights of humans, and only as a way to
further protect humans. We, however, are aiming to find protection for all life.
III.2.c The Real Entity Theory
According to the prevailing real entity theory, corporations have legal personhood
because humans form a collective consciousness that functions as a real entity. I believe that the
environment not only meets this requirement but extends it, considering that its collective
consciousness also incorporates that of the living flora and fauna.
Some may argue that living entities in nature do not have consciousness, so they are not
capable of contributing to a collective consciousness. I believe this to be an anthropocentric
perspective on the matter. As I discussed earlier in the comparison to the disabled, just because
nature does not communicate in the same way humans do does not mean that it is not conscious
and communicative in its own unique way. Nature is extremely adaptable, and adaptability is
one of the primary indicators of consciousness - to be able to discern oneself as independent
from its surroundings, to recognize changes in one’s surroundings, and then to alter one’s own
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actions according to such changes. In exemplifying nature’s adaptability, a tree or plant will
recognize a depletion in its water source or a lack of sunlight and, in turn, actively move its roots
and self in the direction of resources in order to preserve itself. In terms of nature’s ability to
communicate and form a collective consciousness that acts as one, there have been many studies
that prove trees communicate. According to a study done by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, “plants may ‘eavesdrop’ on volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
released by herbivore-attacked neighbors to activate defenses before being attacked
themselves.”30 In short, by using biological transmitters and signals, plants are able to collect
and analyze data given off by adjacent organisms in order to enhance their own survival
techniques. This illustrates how plants communicate with other aspects of nature, and how they
recognize their individual existence in contrast to their surroundings.
Under the real entity theory, there is also the stipulation that a real entity exists
independently of any one group of individuals composing it. I argue that the environment not
only does this, but could actually exist and flourish without the existence of any humans, which
demonstrates its extremely independent nature. Some may then argue that Nature may function
independently of humans, and that all living things constitute its collective consciousness, but
that Nature does not have “surroundings” that enable it be considered an independent entity on
its own accord. This deepens the discussion to consider Earth’s existence in relation to that of
the whole universe. In discussing Nature as a holistic, independent entity that is constituted by
all living things on our planet, we are basically speaking of Earth as a whole; and in doing so we
are discussing Earth in relation to the other entities that compose our solar system. Thus, Nature,
i.e. Earth, is its own independent, real entity with all of its inhabitants forming its collective
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consciousness. Considering these stipulations, Nature counts as an independent, real entity
composed of a collective consciousness that is deserving of rights, if based on this theory.
Furthering this concept under the real entity theory, I believe we could argue that the
environment not only functions as a collective consciousness of the life that composes it, but that
it actually is a real entity. Although this claim might sound a bit outlandish at first, consider a
familiar example: the government. A government is treated as an artificial person that functions
to advance the goals of its populace through its formation of an actual collective consciousness
that constitutes its moral agency. It’s because we think of governments as expressing the will or
mandate of its peoples that we think of it as having agency and having rights. I believe that we
can think of the environment in the same way. Even more than any corporation or government,
the environment could be thought of as a real living organism with the world’s water as its
blood, each continent as its organs, and each living being and thing as its cells. Indeed, the
environment surpasses a corporation or a government in exemplifying the concept of a real
entity because it is not only real but also living.
In anticipating the objections against this perception of the environment as a real and
living entity, one may argue that the environment differs from a government because plants and
animals may not have a common will to express, whereas the government does for its
constituents. Furthermore, one may even argue that a government does not express an actual
collective will, considering the corruption and inequality that ensues from its creation. In
responding to the latter objection, I argue that whether the government actually functions in the
way it was meant to or not is irrelevant because intent is the authoritative reference in legal
matters. The intent of creating America’s democratic republic was for the government to act in
accordance with the will of the people, which is made possible by elected representation. Thus,
according to the law, the government does hypothetically constitute a collective will of its
peoples, as that was its original intent.
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As for the first objection that flora and fauna do not have a will to contribute to a
collective will, this also seems to be a fairly anthropocentric perspective to hold. The will of
each plant and animal is to survive and persist through reproduction over time - a very simple
but universal goal of all living things. At this point in time, humans now have the ability to hold
very individualized goals and wills because we have surpassed the need to solely focus on
securing our survival, since we have achieved dominance over the food chain. Thus, though
nature’s will to survive may not seem as complex as that of humans, it is nonetheless a collective
will that is inherent to all living entities, including humans. I argue, then, that the collective will
expressed by the environment is to survive and secure life on Earth, which is truly the
foundation of all other wills.
With this added insight in how Nature functions as not only a real entity but a real, living
entity, I believe that the real entity theory accurately applies to Nature, which justifies the
extension of legal personhood to Her.
III.2.d The Intelligent Machine Metaphor
Finally, consider the intelligent machine metaphor. Under this theory, corporations are
granted legal personhood because they act as independent, intelligent machines in that they
function without the intervention of any one group of individuals. Using this approach, we could
argue that the environment is arguably a natural, intelligent machine since it functions in a
systematic way with or without the intervention of human action. Furthermore, it not only exists
prior to and after the individual persons composing it, but it did and could continue to exist
without the presence of humans altogether. In fact, at this point in time, one could even argue
that the environment would probably function better without our existence. Does that not
illustrate its superior status as a machine, considering we could not say the same about our
relationship with it? Under this theory, humans would be merely cogs in the machine of nature -
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tools for enhancing the function of the whole - which dismantles many of the anthropocentric
ideals held by humanity regarding our superiority.
In proof of Nature’s superiority, while Nature continues to naturally adapt to the changes
we cause, humans look to nature when trying to adapt or learn. Humans are constantly
dependent on Nature for our knowledge and understanding of reality, yet Nature does not look to
us to learn or adapt. This seems to demonstrate that Nature exemplifies a superior intelligence
and maturity even to that of humanity. If humans were truly the epitome of intelligence within
our world, why would we need to rely on the environment to understand our own reality? One
could argue that neither humanity nor nature inherently understand the functionings of reality,
but that humanity is superior in that we utilize our perceptions of our surroundings to grasp this
understanding while nature remains oblivious. However, I feel that Nature obviously does
understand such inner-workings better than we because it naturally adapts to changes in its
system without referencing how to do so from other entities. Whether Nature does this
subconsciously or not, I believe that its inherent understanding of how to reestablish equilibrium
proves that it understands reality better than we do.
Humans consistently use intelligence as a basis for judging other entities and placing
them in a stratified order, and the environment proves its worth in this distinction through its
natural adaptivity and independence. Thus, based on these attributes, Nature does exemplify a
naturally intelligent machine, which justifies the extension of legal rights to it, according to the
intelligent machine metaphor.

III.2.e Evaluating the Strengths of Each Theory in Applying it to Nature
Based on the analyses of these theories in their application to Nature, I propose that the
real entity theory and the intelligent machine metaphor are the two strongest avenues for
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supporting the extension of legal personhood to Nature. Not only is the real entity theory the
prevailing one in how to perceive corporations in U.S. law, making it an ideal theory on which
base the environmental argument, but it also recognizes the holistic essence of Nature. As I have
demonstrated, Nature is both real and living, which makes it uniquely qualified to be considered
worthy of legal personhood, under the real entity theory.
As for the intelligent machine metaphor, I believe this to be another strong argument due
to its philosophical basis in dismantling the anthropocentric perspective of humanity. It proves
that Nature is intelligent and superior in its own way, which grants it value separate from its
utilitarian benefit for humanity. One of the most difficult obstacles environmentalists will face in
trying to extend rights to Nature will be this belief that Nature is simply a tool for humans as
superior creatures. The intelligent machine metaphor, however, exemplifies why Nature is
deserving of its own rights based on its natural superiority as the all-encompassing entity that
constitutes our reality.
On the other hand, I believe the concession and nexus of contracts theories to be the
weakest arguments for extending rights to Nature because of their vague and broad basis. Nearly
anything could be granted rights under such guidelines. These theories bypass demonstrating
why some entity should be granted rights and skip straight to how the entity is conceived under
the law for some intended effect. In short, these are retroactive approaches that merely define the
limits of a non-traditional rights-bearing entity rather than addressing why the entity in question
is deserving of such rights in the first place.
As for the aggregate theory, I find this to be a subpar approach for the environmental
movement in comparison to the real entity and intelligent machine metaphor theories because of
the inherent inequalities of the approach. The aggregate theory is based on the extension of
human rights to an overarching entity as a way to protect the individuals within it. As such, it
automatically places all other living organisms at a disadvantage because it is merely a tool for
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protecting humanity within the system rather than for protecting the system as a whole. While
the real entity theory discusses the collective in terms of a collective consciousness, which opens
the door to consider the consciousness of other organisms, the aggregate theory limits its
interpretation by focusing on the metaphysical state of humans as a collective. Even if one were
effectively able to utilize this approach in granting Nature legal personhood, it would do nothing
to change the anthropocentric idea that Nature is solely valued according to its benefit to
humans, which I believe limits the intended goal to view Nature as its own entity deserving of
rights and protection.

34

Part IV: Extending Personhood to Nature: The Autonomy Argument
My second main argument is grounded on the premise that autonomy has great value: we
need to extend legal personhood to the environment to protect individual U.S. citizens.
IV.1 Autonomy: a Core American Principle that American Citizens Will Want to Protect
The United States was created in order to escape the tyrannical rule of England’s
monarchy, and our Constitution is thus grounded in the beliefs of small-government and personal
autonomy so as to prevent such oppression. Thus, considering the United States’ ideological basis
in personal autonomy and individual rights, I believe this approach of self-protection from
corporations and an authoritarian government to be the ideal course of action for ensuring
nature’s rights in America. It veers away from a speculative argument of what Nature deserves
towards a more tangible one that focuses on protecting people in terms they can readily
understand. Though many Americans believe environmental rights to be of the utmost
importance, such beliefs are grounded in morals or scientific data that are refutable or questioned.
By contrast, the belief in personal autonomy is usually taken as a bedrock or first principle within
our shared political framework, which makes it more relatable to most American citizens. Under
the argument I am offering in this part of my thesis, one need not be an environmentalist to
support the cause, but merely a proponent of individual rights and someone who accepts the need
for protections against authoritarian governments and exploitative corporations.
IV.2 The Difference between American and Latin American Conceptions of Autonomy
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When referencing the historical examples of Rights of Nature in Bolivia and Ecuador,
recall that these nations also placed a focus on citizen protection from the government by
granting Nature legal personhood and promoting ethnodevelopment. Though the indigenous
religious beliefs figured into a lobbying effort for the establishment of this law, the underlying
purpose of the policy itself was to grant citizens protection from natural resource extraction. In
this way, the citizens of Bolivia and Ecuador were also fighting for personal autonomy and
protection from governmental and corporate actions. Thus, at first glance, it might seem that we
could simply adopt the same argument that was used in these South American countries and
apply it here in North America.
But there is a glaring difference in Latin America’s conception of autonomy and that
found in the United States. The difference lies in our demographic distribution. Most of those
fighting for autonomous rights in Latin America are comparable to our Native American
population, who are arguably still oppressed in many ways. In Latin America, the indigenous
population is a majority of the populace, so their fight for autonomy is more grounded in an antiestablishment effort with the goal of reinforcing indigenous beliefs and ways of life; these
citizens are defending a community-based autonomy rather than an individual autonomy. The
United States, by contrast, celebrates a more individualized concept of autonomy in which each
person, no matter his or her race, religious beliefs, etc., has the right to live and prosper as he or
she wishes without constraint (as long as it does not cause harm to others). It emphasizes
individual protection from entities like corporations, the government, and even communities.
If, then, we argue that legal personhood should be extended to Mother Nature because
doing so will protect citizens’ autonomy, we should stress in an American context that this
extension will protect individual autonomy by preventing any group from accumulating too much
power; protecting individual autonomy rights mitigates the possibility of accrued power in an
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entity that can act in a tyrannical fashion over all others. This is the sort of premise that will be
best received and accepted in the United States.
IV.3 Ways in which Extending Legal Personhood to the Environment would Protect the Autonomy
of American Citizens
The question then becomes, how would granting the environment legal personhood
actually protect individual autonomy? I think it is most helpful to consider the Dakota Pipeline
debacle, and similar examples, in which individual citizens were unable to legally protect their
self-interest in environmental rights or their way of life because they were unable to illustrate
personal monetary loss by the construction plan. In contemporary U.S. law, the only way to
litigate against corporate/governmental plans involving the environment is to prove that one will
be monetarily affected by its construction, or that the construction acts as a substantial nuisance
to the property one owns. There are many instances, however, in which people, both local and
non-local, disagree with the building of a corporate plant or some other construction for other
reasons: because it will mar the natural landscape and ecosystem in general, because they believe
it to be morally wrong, because it will infringe on their way of life, because they do not agree
with the ideals of the company, because its construction will cause immense pollution to common
goods that will affect all future generations, and so on.
Under current U.S. law, citizens are not able to fight explicitly against such plans for
these reasons - they are not seen as substantial enough to be taken into consideration. According
to the modern standing to sue guidelines, the plaintiff must show that they have suffered an
“injury in fact,” establish causation in showing that the injury “fairly can be traced back to the
challenged action,” and show that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of
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the court.31 Thus, for a case to hold up in court it must be oriented around proving that the
plaintiff has suffered direct injury. Even then, though, were the plaintiff to prove injury, there is
still a consideration of cost-benefit analysis that may award him/her damages but not injunction,
so the source problem will continue to exist and cause further damage. For instance, in the United
States case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company (1970), the plaintiff was awarded damages for
the nuisance caused by the Atlantic Cement Company’s pollution, but the court did not award
injunction because the company’s net-worth was considered too high in comparison to the
damage they were causing to justify it be closed. As this demonstrates, our society and
governmental decisions are primarily based on economic consideration in the form of benefit and
cost analysis, which places the citizen at a disadvantage.
However, the concept of personal autonomy does not acknowledge this stipulation that
decisions must be based on economic consideration. The central meaning of personal autonomy
is freedom to pursue one’s goals and desires (as long as they do not harm another); there is no
necessary consideration of personal economic well-being. Thus, by making use of this concept of
personal autonomy, our citizens would be able to fight for environmental change whether they
had an economic argument or not. In fact, this autonomy could be either narrowly or more
broadly conceived, and so be involved in many different kinds of conflicts. By extending
personhood to the environment, citizens would have another legal avenue they could use to
thwart environmental damage which didn’t depend on an economic argument.
IV.4 Existing Examples of Rights of Nature in the United States
The argument I am making in this part of my thesis does have some precedent. The first
steps towards extending rights to Nature in the United States as a way to protect individual
autonomy have already been taken by five U.S. cities/communities. Craig Kauffman, a Political
31

"Substantial Interest: Standing." Legal Information Institute. Accessed April 07, 2019.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/substantial-interest-standing.

38

Science professor at the University of Oregon, and his partner Pamela Martin, analyzed
Pennsylvania’s Tamaqua Borough, Grant Township, and Highland Township, as well as Santa
Monica, California, as examples of local communities that have established such rights to Nature.
In their work, Kauffman and Martin also compare these U.S. attempts to similar ones made in
Ecuador and New Zealand.
Kauffman and Martin claim that the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund
(CELDF), “formed in 1995 by environmental lawyers who concluded that existing environmental
laws were inadequate because they focused on mitigating harms rather than preventing them,”32
is largely responsible for the actions taken by these U.S. communities. The CELDF began
helping communities develop Community Bills of Rights that could provide a legal basis for
residents to defend their interests against corporations invoking property rights to justify
environmentally destructive behavior.
In 2006, with the aid of CELDF, Pennsylvania’s Tamaqua Borough crafted and
established the first Rights of Nature ordinance in the world. It invokes the community’s right “to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of Tamaqua Borough, the soil,
groundwater, and surface water, the environment and its flora and fauna” in order “to ban
corporations and other limited liability entities from engaging in the land application of sewage
sludge.”33 According to Kauffman and Martin, this ordinance is novel because it treats the Rights
of Nature as a tool for strengthening community rights in relation to corporate property rights: it
enables the community members to challenge a corporation in court according to the effects the
corporation is having on the ecosystem, which is easier to prove than negative effects caused on
individual health.
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It is interesting to note, however, that while this ordinance granted legal personhood to all
borough residents, natural communities, and ecosystems, it explicitly denied this recognition to
corporations as a way to limit their rights to interfere “with the existence and flourishing of
natural communities or ecosystems.”34 This denial seems to contradict the federal government’s
extension of such rights to corporations, which is why the ordinance has had difficulty being
upheld in court. This limitation is due to its being a mere ordinance; however, this conflict could
be mitigated were the State to implement Rights of Nature because the State has greater
authority.
Following the establishment of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature (GARN) in
2010, Pittsburgh, PA became the first major U.S. city to recognize the Rights of Nature and ban
shale gas drilling and fracking as a way to “elevate the rights of people, the community and
nature over corporate rights.”35 Following this momentum, one of the founders of GARN began
working with Santa Monica, CA to establish a Sustainability Rights Ordinance. Unlike the
Tamaqua Borough ordinance, Santa Monica’s was not in response to an immediate threat to the
community, but was rather an extension to a Santa Monica Sustainable City Plan that was
established in 1994. In this sense, the Santa Monica case is unique in that it takes a proactive
approach in ensuring future sustainable development rather than acting retroactively. But this just
shows that extending rights to nature as a tactic for allowing people to protect their rights has
some precedent.
Finally, in 2013 and 2014, the Highland and Grant townships of Pennsylvania passed
Community Bill of Rights ordinances. Highland Township was the first to do so, and it was
spearheaded by Highland’s Water Authority with the help of CELDF in response to the growing
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concern that fracking would contaminate the region’s water supply.36 It expanded community
rights, granted ecosystems in the county the right to exist and flourish, and banned all activities of
natural gas and fossil fuel extraction and waste water injection. A year later, Grant Township
followed suit in instating a Community Bill of Rights ordinance in response to Pennsylvania Gas
and Electric’s filing for a permit to inject waste water into one of the unused wells in the
township.37 Considering this township relies entirely on private wells and springs for their
drinking water, the residents became concerned that the injected water waste would leak into
their drinking-water sources. Thus, they established their own Community Bill of Rights
ordinance that prohibited depositing oil and gas waste materials in the township.
In all of these cases, Kauffman and Martin found that they conceptualize Nature on the
ecosystem level, rather than individual flora or fauna, and the ecosystems are sets of “natural
communities” whose welfare is necessary for the wellbeing of human communities. He found
that most of these cases were retroactive approaches to immediate threats, but showed how Santa
Monica’s ordinance functions as a precautionary principle to prevent damage in the future. The
main issue he found was in their legal standing, considering they are merely community
ordinances, which are superseded by State and Federal laws. In fact, the Grant and Highland
Townships’ ordinances were contested in court by energy companies, and the court ruled in favor
of the corporation by saying that the municipality was overstepping its authority. In response, the
residents in both townships developed a new legal structure, the Home Rule Charter, in hopes of
enforcing the Rights of Nature in the U.S. federal system. In summary, Kauffman and Martin
concluded that, in the U.S., “Rights of Nature is linked to the concept of community rights and is
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seen as a tool for communities to protect themselves against the vagaries of corporate property
rights.”38
IV.5 Applying Kauffman and Martin’s Argument to the Autonomy Argument
I believe that these cases of U.S. counties and cities establishing Rights of Nature provide
a great deal of support for my claim that granting such rights can and will act as a tool for
protecting individuals from exploitation by corporations and a tyrannical government. The point
for which I’m arguing isn’t just a theoretical suggestion: as Kauffman and Martin show, it is
building on actual examples that have already been tried in the United States.
My own argument, however, extends beyond these examples in two ways. First, I think
these examples show that Rights of Nature need to be implemented on a state, and eventually
federal, level if they are to be truly enforceable. The fact that these ordinances were contested in
court, and the communities ultimately lost, only exemplifies the nature of our government to put
the interest of corporations and economic concerns over the well-being of its citizens, which is
why it will be important for us promote the extension of legal personhood to Nature on a broader
level where it will have to be enforced.
Second, I believe these existing laws could be strengthened by emphasizing how
extending rights to Nature protects autonomy. Were the Rights of Nature laws to be based on this
concept of personal autonomy, it would help ensure that the individual’s protection and wishes
were considered on an equal basis to the economic considerations. The issue now is that
corporations are worth much more than nearly any damage they can cause. This makes it difficult
for any individual citizen to successfully contest a corporation in court, which is why it is
imperative we alter the argument to place focus on the encroachment of an individual’s autonomy
rights. Thus, by extending legal personhood to Nature under the caveat of securing personal
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autonomy rights, it would grant citizens an alternate and broader route to legally contest the
exploitative actions by corporations and the government.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided two legal approaches that environmental movements may
utilize in their attempt to establish environmental protection laws. I first proposed an
argument by analogy that demonstrated how Nature resembles the disabled and corporations
as non-traditional entities that have already been granted distinct forms of legal personhood in
the United States. Inasmuch as we endorse the arguments to extend personhood to the
disabled and corporations, we should also extend them to Nature.
I then advanced an autonomy argument that advocated for extending legal personhood
to Nature as a way to further protect individual autonomy. I supplemented this autonomy
argument with evidence from regions in Latin America and the United States that have already
granted such rights to Nature, illustrating how and in what ways this approach yields stronger
autonomy protection. In presenting my data, I was sure to compare the cases in Latin America
and the United States within their cultural context so as to demonstrate why the Latin
American method cannot be directly applied in the U.S. due to differences in demographics and
political ideology. In referencing these cases, I also demonstrated the importance of
implementing a Rights of Nature law on the state and/or national level in order to ensure that
it is uniformly recognized and enforced.
I conclude that the ideal application of these two arguments would be to use them in
concurrence with one another. The analogy argument acts as the foundation for proving that
Nature meets the legal requirements for being considered an entity deserving of rights, and the
autonomy argument acts as the mobilizing force in gaining support for the law by diversifying
the environmentalist’s platform and motives. I am not claiming that these are the only ways to
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achieve said goal of extending rights to Nature and securing individual autonomy rights. There
are myriad ways to approach this goal.
Nevertheless, I do believe that my approach addresses issues that often inhibit
environmental action: namely, addressing too small an audience. In this thesis, I have tried to
develop arguments that can appeal to everyone, both environmentalists and not, and unite
them under a common goal. I believe that we can engage in actions that will impact all current
and future generations. Though I believe environmental issues to be of the utmost importance,
and that others should hold the same sentiments considering the dire situation we now face in
light of climate change, I also think it is important to approach such issues from various
perspectives so as to encourage a unified coalition. On my way of thinking, the broader the
arguments, the higher the likelihood of their being accepted and enacted. After all, such broad
arguments form a basis for unlike-minded persons to find common ground. Thus, by
approaching environmentalism from a libertarian standpoint that also supports individual
autonomy rights, my thesis lays the groundwork for these two groups to work together in
achieving a common goal.
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